We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions for agents fit to be held responsible in a normative sense, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. On the basis of Alfred R. Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility it can be argued that even if robots were to have all the capacities usually required of moral agency, their history (...) as products of engineering would undermine their autonomy and thus responsibility. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objeto explicar cuándo en el estado de necesidad la distinción entre un mal mayor o menor responde al universo ético consecuencialista y desde qué consideraciones no lo haría; segundo, explicar por qué es posible desde el principio del doble efecto la ponderación de la vida humana, aceptando la objetivización de sus parámetros según los efectos de una acción. Por ello, a continuación trataremos en la primera sección el concepto de mal en clave consecuencialista y, posteriormente, moral (...) absolutista. Se trata de un análisis sobre la materia que reconoce, en la segunda sección, la importancia de la existencia de estos universos en la ponderación de males. Luego, contrastaremos nuestros razonamientos con las soluciones que, para casos semejantes, se proponen desde el doble efecto para algunas situaciones de estado de necesidad. Finalmente, en la tercera sección, entregaremos los criterios de una política criminal para distinguir y no encubrir exigencias deónticas en el estado de necesidad. (shrink)

I will study the concept of solidarity by looking at patterns of practical reasoning leading to behaviour that can be taken to exemplify solidarity. By studying which kinds of premisses are necessary for taking the motivation to display solidarity, in contrast to altruistic or moral motivation, I try to find necessary conditions for solidarity. I will argue that practical reasoning leading to solidary behaviour is a form of we-reasoning in which some of the premisses are in first person plural form (...) and attribute actions or attitudes to a collective. If this is correct, solidarity is a group concept, and intentional solidary behaviour presupposes identification with a group where others have shared goals or interests. This distinguishes solidary motivation and behaviour from altruistic or moral motivation and behaviour. (shrink)

El presente artículo expone la propuesta de ética de la competición deportiva que elabora el pensador estadounidense Robert Louis Simon. En primer lugar introduzco la crítica que realiza Simon al reduccionismo moral en el deporte, especialmente el marxista. A continuación expongo los principales rasgos de su propuesta ética, concluyendo con la necesidad de dar un paso más y abogar por una fundamentación filosófica; uniendo el principio procedimental y la responsabilidad, defendiendo, en definitiva, una ética del deporte que deberá tener en (...) cuenta tanto el conocimiento de los fines como el de los medios y que tenga la vida, cada vida, como el valor inherente de la práctica del deporte. (shrink)

AI systems are bringing an augmentation of human capabilities to shape the world. They may also drag a replacement of human conscience in large chunks of life. AI systems can be designed to leave moral control in human hands, to obstruct or diminish that moral control, or even to prevent it, replacing human morality with pre-packaged or developed ‘solutions’ by the ‘intelligent’ machine itself. Artificial Intelligent systems (AIS) are increasingly being used in multiple applications and receiving more attention from the (...) public and private organisations. The purpose of this article is to offer a mapping of the technological architectures that support AIS, under the specific focus of the moral agency. Through a literature research and reflection process, the following areas are covered: a brief introduction and review of the literature on the topic of moral agency; an analysis using the BDI logic model (Bratman 1987); an elemental review of artificial ‘reasoning’ architectures in AIS; the influence of the data input and the data quality; AI systems’ positioning in decision support and decision making scenarios; and finally, some conclusions are offered about regarding the potential loss of moral control by humans due to AIS. This article contributes to the field of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence by providing a discussion for developers and researchers to understand how and under what circumstances the ‘human subject’ may, totally or partially, lose moral control and ownership over AI technologies. The topic is relevant because AIS often are not single machines but complex networks of machines that feed information and decisions into each other and to human operators. The detailed traceability of input-process-output at each node of the network is essential for it to remain within the field of moral agency. Moral agency is then at the basis of our system of legal responsibility, and social approval is unlikely to be obtained for entrusting important functions to complex systems under which no moral agency can be identified. (shrink)

El hombre mediocre está integrado por las lecciones sobre psicología del carácter que dio José Ingenieros en la cátedra de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de Buenos Aires, durante el año 1910. En ellas se proponía comprender cómo funcionan las sociedades humanas. Para ello establecía y describía tres tipos o caracteres que según él era posible reconocer en cualquier comunidad de seres humanos: el idealista, el hombre mediocre y el inferior. Ingenieros no ocultaba su admiración hacia el primer tipo (...) pero, más allá de los juicios morales. Hizo el esfuerzo de entender en clave psicológica las particularidades de cada tipo y su función específica en nuestras sociedades. Así, dedicaba una parte importante de El hombre mediocre al segundo tipo, porque él constituye el grueso de las sociedades: «¿La continuidad de la vida social sería posible sin esa compacta masa de hombres puramente imitativos, capaces de conservar los hábitos rutinarios que la sociedad les transfunde mediante la educación? El mediocre no inventa nada, no crea, no empuja, no rompe, no engendra; pero, en cambio, custodia celosamente la armazón de automatismos y prejuicios y dogmas acumulados durante siglos, defendiendo ese capital común contra la asechanza de los inadaptables. Su rencor a los creadores compénsase por su resistencia a los destructores.». (shrink)

We first show that the Generalized Sharing mechanism which is exhaustive, allows a team of identical members voluntarily supplying the observable effort to attain Pareto efficient production under increasing returns provided team size is allowed to vary. We then show that where true effort is imperfectly observable (moral hazard) Pareto efficient production under nonconstant returns to scale is still attainable by varying team size.

The Greek word mētis (μῆτις) traditionally refers to a particular form of wily intelligence associated with the arts of deception (dolos) and the knowledge of tricks (kerdē), subterfuges, and traps. Mētis evokes innovative and ground-breaking solutions, based on the capability to understand, anticipate, and possibly violate the others’ expectations. Most importantly, mētis presupposes practical wisdom, or prudence (phrόnesis), a dispositional quality that underpins all the virtues that deserve to be cultivated by sportspersons and that is pivotal to perfect sportspersons’ moral (...) character. Not only is prudence required to apply mētis profitably for winning a game, but it is also indispensable to perform consistently with the game’s norms—cognizant of sport values. This analysis of mētis is key to illuminate the embodied dimension of tactical and moral reasoning in contemporary sport practice. In this paper, we first argue that the strategic effectiveness of mētis proves that not only sensorimotor control but also higher forms of intelligence, like strategic reasoning, are embodied and inform skilful performance; second, we argue that relying on mētis is necessary not only to interpret the rules of the game in one’s own favor but also to respect the shared values that these rules uphold in the sport practice. (shrink)

La filosofía kantiana se ha destacado por ocuparse por temas tan importantes como la ética, la religión, el derecho, entre otros. Todos ellos desde una perspectiva humanista, es decir, teniendo en cuenta valores como la dignidad humana y la autonomía moral propios de un proyecto ilustrado. Estos valores han servido para cuestionar y criticar muchas de las injusticias y abusos que se cometen contra el ser humano, en especial en el terreno de la religión por no asumir un pensamiento propio. (...) Sin embargo, los cuestionamientos de la filosofía kantiana en el terreno de lo político pierden fuerza y se quedan cortos a la hora de abordar temas tan importantes como la mayoría de edad, la participación y la ciudadana plena. No obstante, pese a los tropiezos que afrontan los argumentos kantianos su valor radica en al posibilidad de mostrar un proyecto ilustrado capaz de manifestarse en contra de las formas de instrumentalización y dominación del ser humano en los distintos ámbitos de su vida, ya sea religioso, político o moral. (shrink)

The objective of this study has been to establish the level of significance that Gustavo Gutierrez and Juan Luis Segundo attribute to politics in their contributions to liberation theology and to extract the relevant consequences for political theory. ;A systematic analysis of the theory of history in the works of these two authors indicates a higher level of integration between Christianity and politics that is usual in Christian political thought. Liberation is equated with salvation and political liberation is seen as (...) one of its components. This brings politics to a position of privilege. When at the service of justice it occupies, for our authors, a high rank among Christian concerns and when devoted to oppression it requires diligent response from every Christian. ;This understanding of politics is valuable in that it accentuates the political aspect of the Christian theory of history, an element frequently underestimated. Certain tensions remain, however, in the theory as a result of this emphasis: between the moral improvement expected from the involvement in political activities conducive to justice and the moral ambiguity of political structures emerging from such activity; and between the use of the concept of class struggle and notions of conversion and reconciliation. Finally, there is the danger of reducing the critical ability of Christians regarding a particular political project by identifying it with the concept of eschatology. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to explore and to verify the utility of the five moral foundations to differentiate between two understudied groups, namely, young offenders who use violence against their parents or dating partners, as well as to predict the extent to which these young people justify violence and perceive themselves as aggressive. Although both types of violence imply, by definition, harming someone and adopting a position of authority, we hypothesize a very different role for at least these (...) two moral foundations. Our results support this idea and show a much lower regard for the five moral foundations, including care and authority, in the child-to-parent violence group than in the dating violence group. Additionally, the authority foundation was able to increase the effectiveness of correctly classifying the participants in one group or the other by 29%. Finally, care and authority, along with fairness, served to predict justification of violence and self-perceived aggressiveness. The moral foundations approach provides preliminary evidence to better understand two specific types of youth violence and extract preventive educational and treatment strategies. (shrink)

The growth of urban violence in Brazil, as in other countries, has led citizens to demand more severe and punitive measures to solve the problem of juvenile crime. One motion submitted to the Brazilian parliament, for instance, proposes to reduce the age of penal majority from 18 to 16 years. Our hypothesis is that popular opinions about this proposal are largely constrained by construal levels and psychological distance. Accordingly, we expect that the knowledge and proximity to the circumstances associated with (...) juvenile transgression will influence opinions about the proposal. To test this hypothesis, we evaluated how opinion against or for the proposal can be explained by psychological distance and moral development theory. We studied two samples, composed of people who do not have a deep experience with the subject and workers from a juvenile justice court. After collecting socio-demographic information from the subjects and their answer to moral dilemmas, the data was subjected to a multivariate analysis by multimodal logistic regression for socio-demographic characteristics, Kohlberg moral stages, and opinion on the reduction of APM as dependent variables. Our findings suggest that 1) opinion about the APM depends on psychological distance and 2) socioeconomic variables may influence the average construal level of adolescent transgressors in the public’s perspective. (shrink)

Background: The surge in the development of social robots gives rise to an increased need for systematic methods of assessing attitudes towards robots. Aim: This study presents the development of a questionnaire for assessing attitudinal stance towards social robots: the ASOR. Methods: The 37-item ASOR questionnaire was developed by a task-force with members from different disciplines. It was founded on theoretical considerations of how social robots could influence five different aspects of relatedness. Results: Three hundred thirty-nine people responded to the (...) survey. Factor analysis of the ASOR yielded a three-factor solution consisting of a total of 25 items: “ascription of mental capacities”, “ascription of socio-practical capacities”, and “ascription of socio-moral status”. This data was further triangulated with data from interviews (n = 10). Conclusion: the ASOR allows for assessment of three distinct facets of ascription of capacities to social robots and offers a new type of assessment of attitudes towards social robots. It appeared that ASOR not only assesses ascription of capacities to social robots but it also gauged overall positive attitudes towards social robots. (shrink)

The publication of "The Practice of Liberal Pluralism" by Willam Galston has appeared as an event of first importance regarding contemporary theory about the relation between pluralism and liberalism. William Galston’s theory has had a visible evolution: in "Liberal Purposes", the main object is a critique of neutralism and a defence of perfectionist liberalism, whereas "Liberal Pluralism" main concern was to draw the limits of state intervention. This evolution is the object of numerous questions in the following discussion. "The Practice (...) of Liberal Pluralism" operates an interesting synthesis on this point. Galston defines himself as a liberal pluralist such as Berlin, but although he acknowledges that conflict between values can be tragic, he minimizes this aspect in the following discussions, and considers the possibility of having prima facie duties. One of the main arguments for the defence of value pluralism is its capacity to explain the complexity of the moral universe. Galston endorses a political pluralism, which means that the sources of authority are multiple. Galston’s liberalism is very tolerant regarding non-liberal communitarian practices, although this tolerance is based on the defence of an exit right, which is a fundamental notion in his theory. In the following discussion, Galston proposes how to understand this right of exit in an adequate manner. (shrink)

Background: The surge in the development of social robots gives rise to an increased need for systematic methods of assessing attitudes towards robots. Aim: This study presents the development of a questionnaire for assessing attitudinal stance towards social robots: the ASOR. Methods: The 37-item ASOR questionnaire was developed by a task-force with members from different disciplines. It was founded on theoretical considerations of how social robots could influence five different aspects of relatedness. Results: Three hundred thirty-nine people responded to the (...) survey. Factor analysis of the ASOR yielded a three-factor solution consisting of a total of 25 items: “ascription of mental capacities”, “ascription of socio-practical capacities”, and “ascription of socio-moral status”. This data was further triangulated with data from interviews (n = 10). Conclusion: the ASOR allows for assessment of three distinct facets of ascription of capacities to social robots and offers a new type of assessment of attitudes towards social robots. It appeared that ASOR not only assesses ascription of capacities to social robots but it also gauged overall positive attitudes towards social robots. (shrink)

This chapter argues that from a particularly weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location, it follows that it is possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of space-time fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. The chapter suggests, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of no less unappealing alternatives. It also discusses a few ways in which their possibility (...) is relevant to various important debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

I argue that from a very weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location it follows that it's possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of spacetime fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. I defend, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of equally radical alternatives. I also discuss a few ways in which their possibility is relevant to various (...) debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

I give shape to a neglected debate in metaphysics, the debate over the ontological priority between individuality and collectivity. I distinguish the debate from more familiar ones in the recent literature and articulate what I call ontological collectivism, the view that collectivity is prior to individuality. I defend the in-principle intelligibility of the view from forceful general objections and argue that not only is it coherent but also of significant interest to the literature: it allows for overlooked alternatives on a (...) variety of central discussions. (shrink)

This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint . Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

. In this paper, adaptive logics are studied from the viewpoint of universal logic (in the sense of the study of common structures of logics). The common structure of a large set of adaptive logics is described. It is shown that this structure determines the proof theory as well as the semantics of the adaptive logics, and moreover that most properties of the logics can be proved by relying solely on the structure, viz. without invoking any specific properties of the (...) logics themselves. (shrink)